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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
changing any of the terms of the judgment It ruled the new judgment was void as an
obvious attempt to "revive the time for taking an appeal" and dismissed the appeal.
RCW 4.32.050 expressly provides: "[T]ime for bringing... appeal shall in no case
be enlarged, or a party permitted to bring such ... appeal after the time therefor has
expired."
This is in accord with the view taken by courts which have considered similar "vaca-
tions." Cases are collected in 89 A.L.R. 941 (1933) and 149 A.L.R. 741 (1944).
Service of Process---Leaving Papers in Unattended Office. In Rohr v. Baker, 52
Wn.2d 903, 329 P.2d 848 (1958), service of a motion for default was effected by the
process server's pushing the documents through the mail slot of the locked office door
of defendant's counsel.
The Washington court reversed dismissal of a petition to vacate the default based
on the form of service, stating that "this was no service at all," under RCW 4.28.240.
This statute permits papers to be served upon an attorney (in those situations in which
such service is allowed) by leaving them in a conspicuous place in his office if there
is no person in the office, but requires that they be left at the attorney's residence if
the office "is not open to admit of such service."
By this decision the court apparently reversed Spencer v. Arlington, 54 Wash. 259,
103 Pac. 30 (1909), which was not cited in the brief of either party or discussed by
the court.
In the Spencer case the court held that service made by dropping the papers through
an open transom above the locked door of appellant's counsel's office was a valid
service within the requirements of the same statute. There an additional factor was
shown: respondent's counsel had seen the papers on a desk in the office of appellant's
counsel the day following the service. But the court's language broadly approved such
a service, even in the absence of that factor. The court rejected the contention that
because the door was locked the office was not "open to admit of such service" (by
placing in a conspicuous place within the office), saying: "[I]t seems to us that the
office was sufficiently open to admit of service by leaving the notice in a conspicuous
place therein if that could be easily accomplished by the use of any opening into the
office." The court further stated in the Spencer case: "It seems to us that on the floor,
and immediately in front of the door on the inside, is a very conspicuous place. Indeed
it is not easy to conceive of a place in the ordinary law office more conspicuous."
Because the Rohr case reached a result contrary to the Spencer case on facts sub-
stantially similar, it seems to represent a shift in the interpretation of RCW 4.28.240.
However, it must be noted that the court appears not to have considered the Spencer
case.
REAL PROPERTY
Easements-Rights of Nonabutting Property Owners. In Capitol
Hill Methodist Church v. City of Seattle,1 nonabutting property own-
ers sought to enjoin (1) the vacation of East John Street between
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Avenues north in Seattle, and (2) the obstruc-
tion of that street by the co-defendant, Group Health, Inc. The plain-
tiffs and the defendants allegedly purchased from a common grantor
in reliance on a plat delineating East John Street as dedicated to
152 Wn.2d 359, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958).
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public use. Plaintiffs alleged this street was a main path of ingress
and egress of their property and that vacation of it would deprive
them of the most direct and convenient access to their property. The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment for the
defendants,2 holding that as nonabutting owners, plaintiffs could not
question vacation by the city since their access was not destroyed nor
substantially affected. In holding that the plaintiffs could not com-
plain of the vacation in the absence of collusion, fraud, or interference
of a vested right,' the court considered the vested rights in the plain-
tiffs as under vacation statutes4 only and failed to discuss whether there
existed such rights in a private easement appurtenant to the land. To
establish whether such an easement exists, the nature and means of
creation of that easement must be examined.
It is settled that parties who purchase from a common grantor in
reliance on a recorded plat acquire a private easement for the purpose
of access over the streets and alleys abutting their property.5 How-
ever, American jurisdictions are not in harmony as to the rights of
those purchasers.'
There are two distinct lines of reasoning as to the type of easement
created from such reliance on a map or plat. The first is an appurtenant
easement by implication. This easement is implied by the court to
give recognition to the apparent intent of the parties.7 When the
vendee, in a bargain and sale transaction, relies on the representations
of a plat or map referred to in the deed, an easement arises for those
streets delineated on the plat or map. An easement which is appur-
tenant to the land is conveyed with it by deed, notwithstanding no
mention of the easement in the conveyance.'
On the other hand, a grantor may be estopped from denying an ease-
ment to his grantee, and common grantees as among themselves are
estopped to deny the existence of an easement for ingress and egress
to their property.' This easement by estoppel does not under all cir-
2 See casenote, page 204, this issue.
a Taft v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 127 Wash. 503, 221 Pac. 604 (1923).
4 RCV 35.79, pertaining to vacation by the city, and RCW 36.87, pertaining to vaca-
tion by the county.
52 TomPsON, REAL PROPERTY 34 n. 87 (1939) ; Annot. 7 A.L.R.2d 608 (1949);
Howell v. King County, 16 Wn.2d 557, 134 P.2d 80 (1943).
"12 TH omPsoN, REAL PROPERTY 37 (1939) ; Annot. 7 A.L.R.2d 608, 610 (1949).
7 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 412, n. 35 (1949), criticizing the use of the term "ease-
ment by estoppel" in Burkhard v. Bowen, 32 Wn.2d 613, 203 P.2d 361 (1949).
8 1 THO mPSON, REAL PROPERTY 537 (1939).
9 3 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 311 (3d ed. 1939).
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cumstances pass with the land but only will pass to one who can trace
his title through a common grantee back to the common grantor.
Once having established that an easement exists, the next step is
to define its scope. No jurisdiction has gone so far as to hold that a
nonabutting property owner has no private right of user or easement
in streets and alleys delineated on the plat or map referred to in his
deed.' ° Three separate views have been developed as to the definition
of such a right." The first view, called the "broad" or "unity" rule,
states that the grantee's private easement extends to all streets, alleys,
parks, or other open areas described on the plat. The second view,
called the "beneficial" or "complete enjoyment" rule, limits the
grantee's private right of user or easement to those streets and alleys
that are reasonably or materially beneficial to the grantee, deprivation
of access to which would reduce the value of his lot. The final theory
is called the "narrow" or "necessary" rule. Its application limits the
private easement to abutting streets and such others as are necessary
to give the grantee reasonable access to a public highway.
The Washington court has never clearly defined what rights the
nonabutting property owner has by way of a private easement. How-
ever, the court has held that abutting property owners have a right of
private easement enforceable against other common grantees." There-
fore, it must be concluded that the court follows the estoppel theory of
private easements existing by virtue of reliance on a plat or map."
The abutter's private easement rights have been strictly limited in
this jurisdiction. In Turner v. Davisson,4 where the plaintiffs at-
tempted to enjoin the obstruction of an alleged private easement, the
court held that, even conceding the point that they were abutting
owners, they could not enjoin. The court, in distinguishing an earlier
case, 5 reasoned that, since they had acquired the abutting strip
through adverse possession, they could not claim of a common grantor
and therefore as against other common grantees could not enforce a
private easement. If Washington followed the easement by implica-
tion theory, this result would seem faulty. However, following the
'0 Annot. 7 A.L.R.2d 608 (1949).
1 Ibid.
12 Howell v. King County, 16 Wn.2d 557, 134 P.2d 80 (1943) ; Van Buren v. Trum-
bull, 92 Wash. 691, 159 Pac. 891 (1916) ; Burkhard v. Bowen, 32 Wn.2d 613, 203 P.2d
361 (1949) ; Brown v. Olmsted, 49 NWn.2d 210, 299 P.2d 564 (1956).
"s Burkhard v. Bowen, supra note 12, noted 26 WAsH. L. Rv. 142 (1949) ; Van
Buren v. Trumbull, supra note 12.
14 47 Wn.2d 375, 287 P.2d 726 (1955).
15 Burkhard v. Bowen, 32 Wn.2d 613, 203 P.2d 361 (1949).
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estoppel theory, this result is right, as upon taking the land by adverse
possession a new chain of title is started, and former rights of ease-
ment that had benefited successive owners (common grantees) cannot
be acquired by the adverse possession.
There is only one other circumstance where the court has held that
the private easement rights of the abutting property owners were
extinguished: where the owner of a dominant estate purchased the
land at a tax foreclosure sale and could not therefore claim under a
common grantor, since foreclosure extinguished all prior interests in
the land.' This rule may no longer be the law, as the 1959 legislature
amended RCW 84.64 by adding:
Any foreclosure of delinquent taxes on any tract, lot or parcel of real
property subject to such easement or easements, and any tax deed
issued pursuant thereto shall be subject to such easement or easements,
provided such easement or easements were established of record prior
to the year for which the tax was foreclosed."
This statute makes it possible for the grantee to trace his title back
through the county to the original grantor for the purposes of estab-
lishing the right to a private easement. The only question remaining
is whether the recording or dedication of the plat constitutes an ease-
ment "established of record."' 8
Prior to the Capitol Hill case, the Washington court had not been
called upon to determine the rights of nonabutting property owners
who purchased in reliance on a map or plat. The cases cited in the
Capitol Hill case deal only with abutting land owners' rights. By
following the estoppel theory of easement existing by virtue of reliance
on the plat referred to in the deed, it is at once understandable that,
since the plaintiffs in this case were not abutting property owners,
they could not complain about the vacation of the street. Further,
since only an easement which is appurtenant to the land can be desig-
nated as a vested right, it is evident that the easement cannot be con-
sidered a vested right which was interfered with by the city's vaca-
tion.
The court failed to discuss the possibility of easement rights of
16 Brown v. Olmsted, 49 Wn.2d 210, 299 P.2d 564 (1956).
1' Laws 1959, c. 129.
'8 Another problem that may arise under the amendment is what happens to a
servient estate when sold at a tax foreclosure sale. Judging from previous cases (cited
in note 12) which hold that the abutting property owner definitely does have a private
right of easement in the street abutting his property, it would seem that the servient
estate would also still be subject to the easements of the dominant estates.
"I See note 12, supra.
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one common grantee as against the other, which cannot be considered
vested rights passing with the conveyance of the property. If both
the plaintiffs and the defendants are indeed common grantees, then
under the estoppel doctrine of easement, they would have a cause of
action to enjoin the obstruction of that easement by the other. How-
ever, in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to enjoin the defendant's
obstruction of the vacated street, the court used language indicating
adherence to the "narrow" rule. In using the "necessary for reason-
able access" test, the court denied easement rights to these nonabut-
ting property owners without having previously defined the limits of
that standard. MORTON G. HmAN
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Municipal Corporations-Labor Unions-Right of Municipal
Employees to Strike-Governmental and Proprietary Functions.
In Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union,' the Wash-
ington court pronounced that municipal corporations are immune to
strikes which would endanger the public health or safety.
The pertinent facts of the case under review are as follows: The
Port of Seattle is classified as a political subdivision of the state and a
municipal corporation. Its functions include the operation, develop-
ment, and regulation of a system of harbor improvements and rail-
and-transfer-terminal facilities within that system. The private oper-
ators of port and dock facilities in the area had collective bargaining
contracts with Local 9 of the International Longshoremen's and Ware-
housemen's Union. The port employed about 350 employees, 24 of
whom were union members at the time of the controversy. While the
port made use of the union's hiring hall, it had consistently refused to
enter into a collective bargaining contract with the union. The union
made demands for higher wages for certain of its members who
were employed by the port. Upon rejection of these demands, the
union members went on strike and began picketing, which resulted
in the cessation of the port's operations. On the same day, January
18, 1958, the port filed a bill to enjoin the union from striking and
picketing. The trial court concluded the strike was illegal and granted
a temporary injunction on January 22, 1958.
This decision was affirmed by the Washington supreme court. The
court began its rationale by taking recognition of the two conflicting
1152 Wash. Dec. 267, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
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